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CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE OPP
COTTON MILLS CASE WITH RESPECT TO
PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING
RALPH F. FUCHSt
A prominent high-light of the dramatic 1940 term of the
Supreme Court of the United States was the sustention in all
essential respects of the validity of the Federal Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act., In United States v. S. W. Darby Lumber Co., 2 in
an opinion by Mr. Justice Stone which will be a point of refer-
ence for many years to come, the Court brought to a head its
present views of the scope of the commerce power and admin-
istered the final coup de grAce to the ill-starred case of Hammer
v. Dagenhart. In Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage
and Hour Division,4 decided the same day, the Court sustained
f Professor of Law, Washington University, on leave of absence, 1941-
1942.
1. (1988) 52 Stat. 1060, c. 676, 29 U. S. C. A. §201 et seq.
2. (1941) 312 U. S. 100.
8. (1918) 247 U. S. 251.
4. (1941) 312 U. S. 126. The Wage and Hour Division, which enforces
all but the child labor provisions of the act, is in the Department of Labor.
For a discussion of the procedural aspects of its work see the monograph
of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941)
77th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. 10, Part I.
The Opp case, in addition to the aspects of the decision covered in the
text, sustains the wage-order provisions of the act as against the contention
that they unconstitutionally confer legislative power upon the Adminis-
trator. The holding upon this point was a foregone conclusion. In the
statute, Congress definitely specified the factors that were to be considered
by the Administrator in arriving at his discretionary determinations. Al-
though in attaching relative weight to these factors and in estimating the
significance of each in a particular case the Administrator is virtually free
to move in any direction he pleases (Golding, The Industry Committee Pro-
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (1941) 50 Yale L. J. 1141, 1145,
2 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
the statutory procedure for arriving at minimum wage orders
for particular industries, as it had been carried out by the Ad-
ministrator. The Court, undertaking to apply the statutory pro-
visions for judicial review of such orders, sustained the order
for the textile industry.
As is well known, the Administrator is authorized to make in-
dustry wage orders, establishing minimum wages higher than the
present statutory minimum of 30 cents an hour, but not to ex-
ceed 40 cents an hour. This authority will continue to be in
effect until a uniform statutory minimum of 40 cents goes into
effect in October, 1945.r After that time, the Administrator will
be empowered to continue industry wage orders which vary the
statutory minimum downward. Wage orders have now been
made for 28 industries. 7
The statutory procedure for arriving at an industry wage
order requires as the first step the convening of an industry
committee by the Administrator.8 This committee is in theory
an investigative and deliberative body.9 When a committee has
arrived at recommendations for minimum wages for the indus-
try,-' it reports to the Administrator. He, then, after notice and
hearing to affected parties, can either accept or reject the recom-
mendations. If he does the latter, he cannot himself formulate
a wage order but must either drop the matter or re-submit it
to the same or a substituted industry committee.11 If the Admin-
istrator approves, he may translate the industry committee's
recommendations into a wage order for the industry in question.
1148, 1161), the same may be said of other, similar discretionary powers
previously sustained by the Court. (1941) 312 U. S. 126, 146. "The fact
that Congress accepts the administrative judgment as to the relative weights
to be given to these factors in each case when that judgment in other re-
spects is arrived at in the manner prescribed by the statute, instead of
attempting the impossible by prescribing their relative weight in advance
for all cases, is no more an abandonment of the legislative function than
when Congress accepts and acts legislatively upon the advice of experts
as to social or economic conditions without re-examining for itself the data
upon which that advice is based." Id. at 145-146.
5. (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, 1062, c. 676, §6, 29 U. S. C. A. §206.
6. (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, 1064, c. 676, §8(e), 29 U. S. C. A. §208(e).
7. (1941) 4 W. H. R. 163, 253, 301, 342, 364, 408, 443, 558, 575, 576, 577,
578, 579.
8. (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, 1062, 1064, c. 676, §§5, 8(a), 29 U. S. C. A.
§§205, 208(a).
9. Id. at §8 (b), 29 U. S. C. A. §208 (b).
10. Id. at §8 (b) (c), 29 U. S. C. A. §208 (b) (c).
11. Id. at §8(d), 29 U. S. C. A. §208(d).
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The order, however, must be supported by the evidence adduced
at the hearing before the Administrator.1 2 In proceedings which
may be brought by "any person aggrieved by an order of the
Administrator" a Circuit Court of Appeals or the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia may affirm, mod-
ify, or set aside in whole or in part an order of the Adminis-
trator. "The review by the court," however, "shall be limited
to questions of law, and findings of fact by the Administrator
when supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive.' 3
The procedural objections to the textile industry wage order,
advanced in the Opp Cotton Mills case, were as follows: (1) that
the definition of the textile industry was improperly changed
after the appointment of the industry committee; (2) that the
Administrator's decision to exclude the woolen industry from
the proceedings and from the order was improperly based; (3)
that the industry committee was not properly representative;
(4) that a hearing conducted before the industry committee did
not satisfy the requirements of due process; (5) that the notice
of the hearing before the Administrator was inadequate; and
(6) that the Administrator's basic finding, to the effect that a
minimum wage of 32 cents an hour for the textile industry
would not "substantially curtail employment," together with cer-
tain other findings, was not supported by substantial evidence.
The Court rejected all of these contentions.
The two amendments to the definition of the industry which
were made after the appointment of the industry committee were
made upon recommendation of the committee. The first excluded
knitted fabrics and at the same time extended the definition to
include certain other products such as blankets and sheets. The
second amendment added to the industry the manufacture of
mixed products containing not more than 45 per cent wool. The
act contains no specific guide to the definition of an industry.
It does, however, provide that the Administrator's final order
shall define the industry to which it applies14 and that the in-
dustry committee may establish classifications within the indus-
try "for the purpose of fixing for each classification * * * the
highest minimum wage * * * which (1) will not substantially
12. Ibid.
18. (1988) 52 Stat. 1060, 1065, c. 676, §10, 29 U. S. C. A. §210.
14. (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, 1064, c. 676, §8(f), 29 U. S. C. A. §208(f).
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curtail employment in such classification and (2) will not give
a competitive advantage to any group in the industry, and shall
recommend for each classification in the industry the highest
minimum wage rate which the committee determines will not
substantially curtail employment in such classification." In
amending the definition of the textile industry the Administrator
took similar considerations into account. The Court held that
it was proper for him to do so; that "it is to the advantage of
the administration of the Act that the completeness and ac-
curacy of the definition should be re-examined and the definition
revised with the aid of the committee at any time before its
report is submitted" ;15 and, inferentially, that no failure of ade-
quate representation of the industry by the committee was
brought about by these particular changes in definition.
The Administrator's original decision to exclude the woolen
industry, which was carried forward into his definition of the
textile industry in his final order, was based upon similar con-
siderations. The Court found no want of propriety here and no
lack of substantial evidence to support the Administrator's con-
clusion.26
The contention that the industry committee was not properly
representative was based upon the fact that, whereas 31 'per
cent of the factories, 51.5 per cent of the value of the product,
and 55 per cent of the wage-earners in the industry were in the
South, only 9 of the 21 members of the committee came from
that section. This geographical distribution of representation
arose as a result of a combination of factors. By the statute the
committee was required to be equally representative of employ-
ers, employees, and the public.7 Accordingly, seven members of
the textile committee were from each category. Among employ-
ers, rayon and silk were each represented by one member, who
came from the North because those textiles are largely manu-
factured there. One of the five cotton manufacturers also came
from the North. Five of the labor representatives were labor
union officials and were from the North because in the textile
industry these organizations center there. Three public repre-
15. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division (1941)
312 U. S. 126, 149.
16. Id. at 149-150.
17. (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, 1062, c. 676, §5(b), 29 U. S. C. A. §205(b).
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sentatives came from the South, but the others came from the
North and Middle West. The Court held that the statutory in-
junction to the Administrator in appointing the committee to
"give due regard to the geographical regions in which the indus-
try is carried on"'18 does not require a strict mathematical pro-
portioning and that the Administrator had not failed in this
instance to take due account of the geographical factor along
with others. 9
Since the statute does not require a hearing to be conducted
at all by an industry committee, the Court had no difficulty in
holding that the hearing which in this instance was held 20 could
not be attacked as procedurally insufficient. The committee, the
Court pointed out, is an investigative body and is not required
to conduct a quasi-judicial proceeding.21
The petitioner's objection to the notice of the hearing before
the Administrator appears to have been based upon the conten-
tion, grounded upon the decision in the second Morgan case,
22
that the notice contained an inadequate definition of the issues
to be taken up. The Court pointed out, however, that the report
of the industry committee was made available to all parties in
advance of the hearing and that, since the hearing was to be
upon that report, there was no want of notice.23
The petitioner's final contention, touching the alleged lack of
support for the Administrator's basic findings in the evidence,
required the Court both to review the economic reasoning of the
Administrator and to appraise the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conclusions. In brief, the Administrator's reason-
ing was that, since a minimum wage in the industry of 321/
cents an hour would raise wages in the industry only 2.1 per
cent and only 2.15 per cent in the southern portion, and would
increase the labor costs of the group of mills most adversely
affected by only about 4.5 per cent, and since further the total
18. Ibid.
19. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division (1941)
812 U. S. 126, 151.
20. For a discussion of hearings before industry committees, which have
been held in a number of instances, see Attorney General's Committee, op.
cit. supra, note 4, at 14-17.
21. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division (1941)
812 U. S. 126, 152.
22. Morgan v. U. S. (1938) 304 U. S. 1.
28. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division (1941)
812 U. S. 126, 154.
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manufacturing cost would be increased only 1.94 per cent on
the average and 8.75 per cent in those mills most adversely af-
fected, and since technological improvements induced by higher
wages would displace relatively few workers, the 821/2 cent mini-
mum would not "substantially curtail employment." The evi-
dence supporting these conclusions was, of course, largely statis-
tical-and therefore hearsay. Only some of it was supported
by the oral testimony of compilers who were subject to cross-
examination. The Court noted that this evidence was not objected
to at the time of the hearing and that even in a court of law
evidence of this character, if admitted without objection, may
be considered by the court. It would follow that the Adminis-
trator might consider such evidence under similar circumstances.
But in addition Mr. Justice Stone pointed out that "it has long
been settled that the technical rules for the exclusion of evidence
applicable in jury trials do not apply to proceedings before fed-
eral administrative agencies in the absence of a statutory re-
quirement." 24 Hence the evidence supporting the Administrator's
findings upon these points would give them substantial support.
The Court dealt similarly with contentions that findings which
the Administrator made with respect to the cost of living for
workers in different sections of the country, leading to the con-
clusion that a classification within the industry for this reason
was uncalled for, were insufficiently supported.2
The decision of the Court upon the foregoing points could
hardly have been different if statutory schemes of regulation
such as that in the Fair Labor Standards Act are to stand at
all. Although it is true that the procedural requirements of the
act and its provision for judicial review, as thus interpreted,
leave in the Administrator, within the statutory range of wages,
a virtually complete discretion with respect to wage fixation for
particular industries, 26 it is impossible to provide by statute both
for the desired flexibility of wage regulation and for effective
restriction of the discretion of the administrative authority. In
dealing with subjects so complex as the definition of industries,
the prescription of classifications within industries, the calcula-
tion of costs, and the estimation of the effects of wage and price
24. Id. at 155.
25. Ibid.
26. See note 4, supra.
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changes, the responsible administrative authority can hardly
accord more than a single reasonably sufficient hearing to inter-
ested parties; and, from the range of testimony adduced, it is
almost inevitable that substantial evidence can be found for any
rational conclusion.27 All that the statute can secure is a proce-
dure which permits, and to a certain extent compels, due con-
sideration of all relevant factors, accompanied by a judicial safe-
guard against entirely high-handed or arbitrary exercise of
authority. The decision upon the procedural and judicial-review
aspects of the case, therefore, in effect gives approval to the
maximum safeguards that could be provided for private inter-
ests in connection with the administrative wage-fixing process.
The line of reasoning in the opinion of Mr. Justice Stone, how-
ever, involves two constitutional propositions which have far-
reaching implications, neither of which could be considered as
firmly established prior to this decision. Neither appears to have
been argued before the Court. Either could be repudiated in the
future if the occasion should arise. In the meantime it is worth
while to consider their implications. The propositions are (1)
that due process of law requires certain minimum procedural
safeguards in connection with such administrative rule-making
as wage fixation for an industry and (2) that judicial review
of the legality of administrative regulations may properly extend
to determining whether administrative findings of fact, upon
which such regulations are made to rest, are supported by sub-
stantial evidence. These propositions will now be discussed.
There can be no doubt that traditionally the guaranty of due
process of law did not secure the observance of any procedural
safeguards whatever in connection with the process of laying
down general regulations by administrative action. Only in re-
cent years has it been suggested that notice and hearing and
the accompanying paraphernalia of procedure should at times
accompany the administrative rule-making process.28 Despite an
27. Golding, supra note 4.
28. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final
Report (1941) 105. See, however, the acute forecast of James Hart in his
Ordinance Making Powers of the President (1925) 175, to the effect that
Wichita R. R. & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1922) 260 U. S.
48 (itself a rate case) "raises the interesting possibility that, in industrial
ordinance making, due process may make notice and hearing essential."
The Wichita case is one of the two upon which the Supreme Court later
relied in Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan (1935) 293 U. S. 388, in for the first
8 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
impressive array of statutory provisions and administrative prac-
tices which secure participation by interested parties in the rule-
making process,29 the basic doctrine has remained that such pro-
cedural safeguards are not required by the Constitution, either
because rule-making is legislative in character and hence need
not be accompanied by a judicial type of procedure, 0 or because
procedural safeguards are impractical in carrying out functions
of such wide scope, involving nunlerous parties, many of whom
may be unknown to the administrative authorities.3 1
There are a number of analogies, however, which suggest pos-
sible limitation of this basic constitutional doctrine with respect
to procedure in administrative rule-making. The prescription of
rates for public utilities, which undoubtedly was legislative in its
origins, has been declared to be quasi-judicial when carried on
administratively and now is accompanied by an elaborate range
of constitutionally-secured procedural safeguards. 2  It may be
asked, moreover, whether there really is any clear difference be-
tween administrative rule-making on the one hand and admin-
istrative "adjudication" on the other, and whether the practical
reasons for care in conducting the latter are any greater than in
carrying on the former. If the grounds of distinction between
time imposing procedural requirements (findings to accompany the regula-
tions) upon administrative rule making.
29. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final
Report (1941) 103 et seq.
30. Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) 197 U. S. 11; Belcher v. Farrar
(1864) 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 325; State ex rel. v. Newark Milk Co. (1935)
118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 AtI. 116; Health Department of New York v. Rector
of Trinity Church (1895) 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833; State v. Quattropani
(1926) 99 Vt. 360, 133 Atl. 352. "Where an act of government applies to
an indefinite number of people alike and thus establishes a general princi-
ple, notice to every individual affected thereby is impossible and unnecessary
and the generality of the principle is supposed to be a guaranty against its
being arbitrary and unreasonable. This is the fundamental distinction be-
tween administration and legislation; the former requires notice and hear-
ing which with regard to it constitutes due process, while the latter does
not." Freund, The Police Power (1904) 15. In this view, administrative
regulations are an exercise of delegated legislative power, rather than of
the administrative power itself. Freund, Administrative Powers Over Per-
sons and Property (1928) 15. The legislative analogy is criticized in Attor-
ney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report (1941)
101-102.
31. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. U. S. (1933) 288 U. S. 294;
Belcher v. Farrar (1864) 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 325.
32. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota (1890) 134 U. S. 418; St.
Joseph Stockyards Co. v. U. S. (1936) 298 U. S. 38; Morgan v. U. S.(1936) 298 U. S. 468, (1938) 304 U. S. 1. See also Southern Ry. v. Vir-
ginia (1933) 290 U. S. 190.
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rule-making and "adjudication" fail, then it is arguable that they
should be assimilated for procedural purposes and that the same
constitutional doctrines apply to both.
Now it is perfectly true that there is no hard and fast neces-
sary distinction between rule-making by administrative agencies
and other types of functions which those agencies perform. At
least in many instances, there is knowledge of the proceedings
by substantially all interested parties in rule-making as in other
types of proceedings.33 It is sometimes possible, indeed, for an
administrative agency to name all the interested parties as re-
spondents and to conduct the proceedings as though they were
adjudicative in character.34 It may be just as necessary, more-
over, for affected private interests to protect themselves in rela-
tion to proposed regulations as it is in proceedings of an adjudi-
cative character, since their rights will be disposed of by the
regulations as finally as they could be if a license were revoked
or denied or a cease-and-desist order were issued in respect to a
named party. 5
The foregoing considerations, however, point rather to a real-
istic approach to the problem of procedure in administrative rule-
making than to ignoring the distinction between rule-making and
38. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making (1938) 52 Harv.
L. Rev. 259, 263, 266, 277.
84. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit.
supra, note 29, at 110-111.
85. "A rule or regulation is promulgated ** * it is going to be effec-
tive on such and such a date. In the future your license will come up * * *
and you have the unhappy alternative of complying with that rule or regu-
lation * * * or of violating the same and standing the chance and the
certainty * * * that * * * it will be used as grounds for revocation."
Testimony of Mr. Duke M. Patrick with respect to the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, Transcript of Proceedings before the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure, June 27, 1940, 64-65. Actual ille-
gality of a regulation could, of course, be made a ground of judicial Teversal
of the Commission's revocation or denial of a license on the basis of the
regulation; but determinations of fact, unless wholly arbitrary, and dis-
cretionary decisions underlying the regulation, are made with finality in the
process of formulating it. For an indication of the nature of the contend-
ing private interests that are disposed of, often with relative finality, in
rule-making proceedings, see Attorney General's Committee on Adminis-
trative Procedure, op cit. supra, note 29, at 108-109. Under the Bituminous
Coal Act it has become necessary, in order to give effect to the statutory
injunction to "preserve as nearly as may be existing fair competitive oppor-
tunities," to break down the price-fixing proceedings in the end into pro-
ceedings to establish a price for each grade and size of coal produced in
each mine in the country, with regard to each separate market in which
that coal is sold. Rostow, Bituminous Coal and the Public Interest (1941)
50 Yale L. J. 543, 577 et seq.
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"adjudication." According to the conventional distinction, when
a proceeding involves named parties, it may be considered ad-
judicative in character; when there are no such parties and the
order that is contemplated will govern all who may be concerned,
the administrative proceeding is an instance of rule-making.80
It is true that the latter may at times involve fewer parties than
sometimes are concerned in the former and may affect them very
definitely and vitally. We cannot say, therefore, that rule-making
applies to many persons and adjudication only to a few, or that
the latter involves definite rights or privileges whereas the
former does not. Procedural safeguards may be as necessary in
rule-making as in "adjudication." If, however, procedure in con-
nection with the two types of functions can usefully be discussed
separately, and if realistic, fair procedural provisions can be
secured for each type of function by considering it separately, it
may be useful to deal with them on that basis. This has been
the practice in modern discussions of administrative law.37
Realistic considerations, as well as a certain amount of assimi-
lation of rule-making proceedings to those of an adjudicatory
nature, have led to the introduction of procedural safeguards into
some administrative rule-making in recent years. It is possible
to discern categories of rule-making with respect to which these
safeguards have become frequent if not usual.38 In these circum-
stances it is natural to ask whether due process of law does not
require that such safeguards be employed in at least some in-
stances of rule-making as it does in many types of administra-
tive adjudication. Even though it is true that no such constitu-
tional mandate has been operative until now, one might easily
evolve, as constitutional requirements have evolved for other
types of proceedings.39
The suggestion that due process of law requires the observance
of procedural safeguards in rule-making as well as in other types
36. Fuchs, supra note 33, at 265.
37. Id. at 265; Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Adminis-
trative Law Theory (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 538, 545, 548.
38. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit.
supra, note 29, at 103-108. For a criticism of the use of categories in this
connection see Feller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age
(1941) 41 Colum. L. Rev. 589, 595.
39. Note (1931) 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 96; Note (1932) 80 U. Pa. L. Rev.
878; Note (1931) 4 Sel. Ess. on Const. Law 557, 579; Hanft, Utilities Com-
missions as Expert Courts (1936) 15 N. C. L. Rev. 12, 4 Sel. Ess. on Const.
Law 592.
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of administrative proceedings emerged very prominently after
the decisions of the Supreme Court in Panama Refining Co. V.
Ryan,'4 United States v. B. & 0. Railroad Co.41 and Morgan V.
United States.42 In the first two cases it was definitely held that
administrative regulations, in the one case promulgated by the
President of the United States himself,43 must be accompanied
by supporting findings of fact. This is so even when the statute
does not require such findings and the necessity for them rests
solely upon the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 4
The Morgan case, although it did not involve an instance of ad-
ministrative rule-making as above defined, was widely inter-
preted as imposing its procedural requirements, which were of
a somewhat elaborate character, upon all administrative pro-
ceedings that vitally affect private interests.4 5
Against the background of the .foregoing cases Congress
enacted a number of regulatory statutes, including the Fair Labor
Standards Act, under which administrative rule-making plays
a prominent part, and provided in the statutes for the observance
of elaborate procedural safeguards in connection with the pro-
mulgation of regulations."6 Either because of supposed consti-
tutional necessity or because of practical considerations, or for
both reasons, hearings of an essentially judicial, or "adversary"
type became a feature of the administrative rule-making process
in large areas of administration. 47 A number of pertinent con-
stitutional questions have remained prominent since that time.
These may be stated as (1) whether it is indeed true that con-
stitutionally-required procedural safeguards, other than that of
supporting findings in certain instances,-" attach to the process
of administrative rule-making; (2) if so, what specific procedural
practices are embraced within them, and (3) under what cir-
cumstances these safeguards apply, as over against the circum-
40. Note 28, supra.
41. (1935) 293 U. S. 454.
42. (1936) 298 U. S. 468, (1938) 304 U. S. 1.
43. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan (1935) 293 U. S. 888.
44. Ibid.
45. Fuchs, in Symposium on Administrative Law (1939) 9 Am. L. Sch.
Rev. 139.
46. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit.
supra, note 29, at 108 et seq.
47. Fuchs, supra note 33, at 276 et seq.
48. Text at note 43, supra.
1941]
12 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
stances in which the traditional absence of constitutionally-re-
quired procedures in rule-making still obtains.4
As regards the third question, it is fairly clear that if such
procedural safeguards in rule-making are constitutionally re-
quired, they apply particularly to price-fixing, wage-fixing, the
designation of commodity standards, and certain related func-
tions which have been prominent in recent statutory regulation
of business.50 Wage-fixing under the Fair Labor Standards Act
obviously is an instance of this sort. It is therefore not surpris-
ing that the Opp Cotton Mills Company should have alleged a
constitutional basis for its procedural contentions. Although the
Court did not sustain these contentions, it did assume the ap-
plicability of due process criteria, stating that these are not more
strict than the provisions of the act and the procedure actually
followed. "The proceedings before the Administrator * * * satis-
fied the requirement of due process without further requirement,
which the statute omits, of a hearing on notice before the com-
mittee.' ' 51 The Court also characterized the proceedings before
the Administrator himself as "judicial in character," requiring,
no doubt, the observance of definite procedural safeguards.5 2
Thus one may imply an affirmative answer to the first question
stated above, as well as the inclusion of administrative wage-
fixing within the implied constitutional requirement. The fact
that the procedure actually followed conformed to due process
throws some light upon the character of the requirement but
does not establish its minimum content.
One must, however, exercise caution in connection with these
conclusions. At times due process is envisaged in discussions of
administrative and constitutional law as a sort of procedural
norm which may exist apart from constitutional considerations
and which the Constitution may or may not require in particular
situations. The reasoning is analogous to that which formerly
gave rise to the question whether the exercise of the "police
power" is subject to the requirements of due process of law in
49. See Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Adminis-
trative Law (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 647, 659, 665 et seq.
50. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit.
supra, note 29, at 107-108.
51. Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division (1941)
312 U. S. 126, 153.
52. Id. at 147.
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the substantive sense or not.53 If this reasoning be followed,
the Opp Cotton Mills case may be taken as interpretating the
requirements of a norm embodied in the statute rather than in
the Fifth Amendment-in short, "statutory due process." Since
the statute requires a hearing before the Administrator, the
Court would then be undertaking to say what that requirement
implies. It might or might not follow that the Constitution would
impose the same requirements if the statute did not, or render
the statute invalid because of their absence.54 It seems unlikely,
however, that Mr. Justice Stone would have used the words "due
process," which are now so familiar as expressive of constitu-
tional requirements, in any other sense. It seems likely, rather,
that the Court, with or without conscious consideration of the
matter, assumed that a constitutional requirement of due pro-
cedure does attach to administrative wage-fixing under the Fair
Labor Standards Act. If this is true, the doctrine of some earlier
cases that procedural requirements do not attach to administra-
tive rule-making' 5 may be taken as having been repudiated as to
some situations, at least for the time being. But the question
of what types of proceedings, other than wage-fixing, the newly
recognized constitutional requirement covers and the question of
what procedural safeguards it embraces, remain to be elaborated.
For light upon these questions one must turn, first, to existing
statutory patterns of procedure in rule-making and, second, to
a limited number of cases in the state courts and lower federal
courts that have dealt with these problems.
Existing statutes which contain procedural requirements for
administrative rule-making appear to fall into two principal
categories-with gradations between, of course. In the first cate-
gory are those statutes which simply require a "hearing" or
53. See the discussion of earlier authorities by the Supreme Court of
Iowa in Peverill v. Board of Supervisors of Black Hawk County (1929)
208 Iowa 94, 108, 222 N. W. 535, 542. The modern view is, of course, that
all exercise of governmental power is subject to the requirements of due
process, but that the content of this requirement varies with the necessities
of the situation dealt with. Mott, Due Process of Law (1926) 326.
54. Note (1941) 29 Geo. L. J. 882, 886-887. In Southern Garment Manu-
facturers Ass'n v. Fleming (App. D. C. 1941) 4 W. H. R. 371, National
Ass'n of Wool Manufacturers v. Fleming (App. D. C. 1941) 4 W. H. R.
396; Andree & Seedman, Inc. v. Administrator (App. D. C. 1941) 4 W.
H. R. 378, the conformity of numerous details of the wage-hour procedure
to the statutory requirements is discussed. The procedure is sustained in
all respects.
55. Note 30, supra.
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"notice and hearing," without more.50 If the procedure under
such a statute is questioned in court, the issue may be either
whether the legislative intention with respect to the character
of the hearing has been carried out or whether the constitutional
requirements for a hearing in such circumstances have been com-
plied with. Often the two ways of looking at the matter are
difficult to distinguish.57 The other type of statute includes those
which require that the administrative regulation, when issued,
be based upon findings that are supported by evidence in the
record of the hearing and those which inferentially make the
same requirement by subjecting the resulting regulations to judi-
cial review in which the court is permitted to set aside a regula-
tion if a supporting finding is not based upon substantial evi-
dence in the record 8 In these statutes, apparently, the legisla-
tures contemplate full oral hearings, at which all the facts in
support of the regulations are brought forward, presumably for
the purpose of permitting affected interests to refute .them and
perhaps cross-examine with respect to them, as well as of facili-
tating judicial review. Whether or not these statutes are at
present expressive of constitutional requirements, they may, as
interpreted, in time become a pattern which the courts will hold
to be constitutionally necessary in certain circumstances.
The cases in which procedural requirements for administrative
rule-making have been considered, whether as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation or as a matter of actual constitutional re-
quirement, throw further light upon the considerations involved.
Some of these cases have received previous consideration in the
pages of this review,5 9 including three0 that were decided shortly
after the first Morgan case had directed attention to the proce-
dural problem. Two of these held that the requirements of that
56. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit.
supra, note 29, at 105-107; Note (1939) 24 WASHINGTON U. LAw QUARTERLY
233, 239-240; Andrews, Administrative Labor Legislation (1936) 82-84.
57. Morgan v. U. S. (1936) 298 U. S. 468, (1938) 304 U. S. 1; Fuchs,
supra note 45.
58. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit.
supra, note 29, at 108-109; text at notes 64, 66, infra.
59. Note (1939) 24 WASHINGTON U. LAW QuARTERLY 233.
60. Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew (D. C. E. D. Va. 1936) 16 F.
Supp. 575, aff'd (1937) 300 U. S. 608; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Industrial
Comm. (D. C. Minn. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 370; Baldwin v. Dellwood (1934) 15
Misc. 762, 270 N. Y. S. 418; State ex rel. v. Newark Milk Co. (1935) 118
N. J. Eq. 504, 179 Atl. 116; Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control
Comm. (1938) 332 Pa. 15, 1 A. (2d) 775.
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decision applied, respectively, in the administration of a state
minimum wage law6' and in the establishment of minimum prices
under a state milk control act.62 The third case held that the re-
quirements of the Morgan decision did not apply to the fixing of
minimum prices for milk.6 3
Since the foregoing decisions were handed down, other cases
have been decided with respect to both minimum-wage and milk-
price fixing, as well as with regard to the fixing of barbers' prices
and rates for dry cleaning. The principal points of procedure in-
volved have been, first, the legality of basing a regulation in part
upon evidence not made of record at a hearing required by
statute and, second, the necessity of interim findings after a
statutory hearing has been held and before oral argument is had.
A brief review of these cases will serve to indicate the present
state of judicial doctrine with regard to rule-making procedure.
In McGrew v. Industrial Commission," the Commission was
held to have proceeded improperly in setting minimum wages
and maximum hours for women and minors in the retail trades
of Utah. The procedure prescribed by the statute corresponded
closely to that in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Wage orders
were to be made industry by industry, with an investigation by
a wage board in each industry before action by the Commission.
After the wage board had made its recommendations, the Com-
mission was directed to hold public hearings upon them and then
to issue an order. Review of wage orders by the courts was per-
mitted and was to be upon the evidence taken at the hearing.
In the particular case the only hearing held by the Commission
was what the Court called a "public meeting," at which the Com-
mission introduced no evidence but simply afforded an opportu-
nity to interested parties to express their views. No witnesses
were sworn and no record of their statements was made. The
Court therefore remanded the case to the Commission with direc-
tions to hold a more adequate hearing. Had the decision rested
solely upon the necessity under the statute of providing a record
61. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Industrial Comm. (D. C. Minn. 1938) 24
F. Supp. 870.
62. Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm. (1938) 332 Pa.
15, 1 A. (2d) 775.
68. Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew (D. C. E. D. Va. 1936) 16 F. Supp.
575.
64. (1938) 96 Utah 203, 85 P. (2d) 608.
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of the hearing, upon which judicial review of the wage-hour
order might be based, the case would not have constitutional im-
plications. The Court did not, however, stop at this point. It
went on to hold that minimum wage hearings must be conducted
with "regard to judicial standards-not in a technical sense but
in regard to fundamental requirements of fairness,-that one
shall hear before one condemns, and that judgment shall be based
on evidence-which are the essence of due process in a proceed-
ing of a judicial nature." These non-technical judicial standards,
according to the Court, mean that all the evidence upon which
the Commission acts must come in at the hearing and that there
must be findings of fact supported by substantial evidence. The
first Morgan case" was cited along with decisions involving
workmen's compensation and public utility proceedings, and Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes in the Morgan case was echoed in a demand
for the observance by administrative agencies of "the inbred
concepts of fair play and the cherished traditions of a cautious,
deliberate and judicious determination of the questions affecting
people's rights or liberties."
People v. Johnson" was another minimum wage case, in which
the Western Union Telegrapk Company case and MecGrew v. In-
dustrial Commission were cited with approval. The specific diffi-
culty with the proceedings leading to the wage order here was
that, in the view of the Court, the Commission's notice of its
hearing upon the proposed order was insufficient. This insuffi-
ciency was caused by the fact that the order in question did not
relate to a specific industry but applied to all "unclassified occu-
pations," which were defined as including "all employment not
classified" under certain designations of industries and occupa-
tions, for most of which wage orders had previously been made.
The Court found, however, that the enumeration of classified oc-
cupations included some for which no orders had been made and
which were later covered by the "unclassified" order, and omitted
some for which orders had already been issued. Accordingly,
the notice did not serve adequately to convey information to all
parties actually affected that their interests were involved in the
wage proceedings. The constitutional import of the decision is
rendered somewhat doubtful by the fact that the Court both
65. Morgan v. U. S. (1936) 298 U. S. 468.
66. (Cal. Super. Ct. 1941) 109 P. (2d) 770.
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stated that "an opportunity for the interested parties to be heard,
in a matter of this kind, where the legislature has committed to
a special tribunal the fixing of wages" is essential to due process,
and mentioned that "the provision for the hearing and for notice
thereof, being a part of the statutory embodiment of due process,
must be regarded as mandatory, for, even though some other
form of hearing or some different notice might have been re-
garded as sufficient, the statute has not so declared, and com-
pliance must be had with what has been, not merely with what
might have been, provided." The Court seemingly intends, how-
ever, not that procedural requirements might have been omitted,
but merely that others equally adequate might have been suffi-
cient.
Recent cases involving minimum-price orders under state milk
control acts, like those decided somewhat earlier,6" 7 have similarly
involved the question, among others, of whether the administra-
tive authority is obliged to incorporate the evidence in support
of its order in the record of the hearing when the statute re-
quires a hearing to be held. In a Pennsylvania Superior Court
case,88 following an earlier decision in which the supreme court
of that state had held that a complete record of the evidence must
be built up at the hearing, 9 it was decided that advantage of an
administrative failure to bring forward some of the evidence at
the hearing could be taken only in direct review proceedings.
Objection to this procedural defect, which was advanced in de-
fense of a prosecution for violation of the price order, came too
late. The Court also remarked that, since all parties were af-
forded ample opportunity to offer evidence and argument at the
numerous hearings held, the proceedings appeared to have been
entirely fair. It also stated that there was ample evidence in the
record to support the order.
The matter of administrative procedure in connection with
milk-price orders has received extensive attention in the Cali-
fornia case of Ray v. Parker.70 The State Milk Control Act l
67. Note 60, supra.
68. Commonwealth v. Ziegler Dairy Co. (1940) 11 A. (2d) 669.
69. Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm. (1938) 332 Pa.
15, 1 A. (2d) 775.
70. (1940) 15 Cal. (2d) 275, 101 P. (2d) 665.
71. Cal. Agriculture Code (Deering 1937) c. 10. Subsequent changes con-
tained in Cal. Stats. (1939) c. 941 (Deering's Supp. 1939, 373 et seq.), not
applicable to the proceedings in this case, do not affect its holding.
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required that at least one hearing be held in connection with the
formulation of any price order, that the testimony at such hear-
ings be under oath, and that a record be kept.7 Certain findings
were required to be made as a basis for any price order;"" but
these covered only limited aspects of the situations with which
such orders must deal; and the statute contained no requirement
that findings be based-upon evidence in the record of the hearing.
The section providing for judicial review specified simply that
"any order of the Director hereunder substantially affecting the
rights of any interested party may be reviewed by any court of
competent jurisdiction" within thirty days after its effective date
or after its injurious effects become reasonably apparent. 4 At
the hearings that were conducted with reference to the order in
question, the Director of Agriculture announced that the infor-
mation upon which his proposed order, which had been distrib-
uted with the notices of the hearings, was based, was available
for inspection, and that certain of his assistants and experts who
had gathered this information were available for cross-examina-
tion. Evidence in support of the proposed order was not actually
offered at the hearings. The Director also announced his readi-
ness to receive evidence from all interested parties. As a matter
of fact evidence was offered by interested parties and upon some
occasions assistants to the Director were subjected to cyoss-ex-
amination. The Court stressed the legislative character of the
proceedings, reviewed many earlier cases, and held the proce-
dure employed by the Director to have been entirely sufficient.
It paid tribute to the care with which the milk-price problem
had been investigated and it pointed out that even the limited
hearings which were had resulted in a record of several hundred
pages. Edmonds, J., dissented upon the ground that the statute
impliedly required the Director to present his case at the hear-
ings and that the partial record actually made was an insufficient
basis for judicial review of the order.
The necessity of an intermediate report, consisting of a tenta-
tive order and accompanying findings, as a basis for argument
in advance of the issuance of a final order, was presented in the
Ziegler Dairy Company case. 5 The contention that such a report
72. Id. at §736.12.
73. Ibid.
74. Id. at §735.6.
75. (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940) 11 A. (2d) 669.
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was necessary was based upon the second Morgan decision.76 The
Court drew a clear distinction between such a proceeding as that
in the Morgan case, in which named respondents enter into a
"contest with the government," and a proceeding which even-
tuates in a general price order. It held that in the absence of a
specific statutory requirement no such intermediate report is
necessary in the latter type of proceeding.
Other aspects of rule-making procedure, involving constitu-
tional considerations, have arisen in a number of recent cases.
In Johnson v. Michigan Milk Marketing Board7 the Court held
the statutory provision for the composition of the Milk Market-
ing Board to be unconstitutional because it provided for the mem-
bership, in addition to the Commissioner of Agriculture, of two
milk producers and only one distributor and one consumer. Al-
though "no claim is made that any member of the present Board
has acted unfairly or arbitrarily," the Court held that a balanced
Board is essential to due process. The Court relied on Carter v.
Carter Coal Company,78 which held unconstitutional a provision
of the first Bituminous Coal Act giving legal force to such wages
in the bituminous coal industry as might be agreed upon by the
producers of more than two-thirds of the annual national tonnage
and more than one-half of the workers employed. The Court also
drew an analogy to the judicial function and pointed out that
"no one should act as a judge in his own cause." McAllister, J.,
dissenting with the concurrence of North, J., pointed out both
that the function here involved was not a judicial one and that
the members of the Milk Marketing Board became public officials
for the purpose of performing their functions under the act, so
that the Carter Coal Company case was inapplicable. The com-
position of the Board did not in this view present a serious due-
process issue.79
In Lion Oil Refining Co. v. Bailey80 the question of the suffi-
ciency of the findings of the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission,
made in connection with an emergency shut-down order for all
the regulated wells of the state, was decided favorably to the
Commission. The Court held that, while findings as to the essen-
76. Morgan v. U. S. (1938) 304 U. S. 1.
77. (1940) 295 Mich. 644, 295 N. W. 346.
78. (1936) 298 U. S. 238.
79. See Comment (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 872.
80. (1940) 200 Ark. 436, 139 S. W. (2d) 683.
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tial facts were necessary, a statement substantially embracing
them, even though not denominated a statement of findings, was
sufficient. In another case8' the Supreme Court of Florida sus-
tained as constitutional an act permitting the fixation of mini-
mum prices for the laundry and dry-cleaning businesses, but
noted that a hearing in substantial compliance with the views
of the Supreme Court in the second Morgan case82 would be
necessary. In Whittenburg v. United States8 3 the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sustained the constitutionality
of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act,84 remarking that
the statutory provisions for "notice to and hearing of those to
be affected" and for judicial review of orders, made it apparent
that liberty and property would not be taken without due process
of law.
It is evident from the foregoing decisions that the courts are
inclined to attach some sort of procedural requirements, based
upon the due process provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, to the performance of rule-making functions by
administrative agencies, in situations where the vital economic
interests of private parties are directly affected. The statement
of such procedural requirements in constitutional doctrine is
now usual, owing to the abandonment of the legislative practice
of conferring this type of rule-making powers without statutory
safeguards.85 One cannot quarrel with such a result under a
system in which the validity of governmental powers affecting
private interests must be approved by the courts; for it is un-
doubtedly true that under some circumstances administrative
rule-making may affect such interests vitally and with as much
finality as other types of governmental action. 8 Statutes which
are too highly fraught with the danger that the powers they
confer will be exercised without the knowledge of interested
parties or without an opportunity for them to make their views
known, may rightly be stricken down. An instance occurred
81. Miami Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Board (1938)
134 Fla. 1, 183 So. 759.
82. (1938)-304 U. S. 1.
83. (1939) 100 F. (2d) 520.
84. (1937) 50 Stat. 246, c. 296, 7 U. S. C. A. §601 et seq. The milk-
price provisions of the act were sustained generally in United States v.
Rock Royal Cooperative (1939) 307 U. S. 533.
85. Text at note 38, supra.
86. See note 35, supra.
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some years ago in a case in which the Supreme Court of Kansas
held unconstitutional an act which provided for the regulation
of electric wiring in buildings by the "National Electrical Code,"
promulgated by a private organization, without statutory provi-
sion for procedural safeguards.8 7
The decisions here reviewed still leave very much in doubt,
however, the precise content of the constitutional requirement
for procedural safeguards in rule-making, as well as the types of
rule-making to which the safeguards are applicable. The laying
down of uniform procedural standards is, indeed, practically im-
possible.8 8 Any rule that might be stated with respect, say, to
the necessity of a hearing, even though it were limited to price
and wage-fixing or to some other reasonably well-defined cate-
gories of administrative regulation, 9 would both ignore im-
portant distinctions and either be added to existing investigatory
and conference procedures, which are sufficient in themselves, or
would tend to displace them.90 The establishment of constitu-
tional minima of procedure in rule-making must, therefore, not
exclude variety and adaptability, which are essential to maximum
utility.
Recognition that there may be variety, and that procedural
requirements which attach to some instances of rule-making do
not necessarily attach to others, appears in some of the decided
cases. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,"' which first announced the
rule that there must be findings in connection with the promul-
gation of executive regulations, was shortly followed by Pacific
87. State v. Crawford (1919) 104 Kan. 141, 177 Pac. 360. The delega-
tion of public authority to a private group is an independent ground of
objection to such a statute. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) 298 U. S.
288. The objection is obviated where the wishes of the private group be-
come law only after the discretionary approval of a properly-constituted
public authority. Herrin v. Arnold (1938) 183 Okla. 392, 82 P. (2d) 977.
88. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit.
supra, note 29, at 108; Fuchs, supra note 83.
89. The fixing of minimum wages or prices has quite different effects,
for example, from the fixing of maxima. The latter places a definite,
legally-prescribed limit upon the economic gains of the recipients, from
which it is difficult, if not impossible, to escape; the former usually imposes
no such rigid limits, since more than the minimum may be demanded on
the one hand and, on the other hand, increased costs caused by paying
higher wages or prices can be shifted in whole or in part, except by con-
sumers. These differences in economic effect may be reflected legitimately
in the procedures employed when prices or wages are fixed.
90. See Feller, supra note 38, at 596.
91. Note 28, supra.
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States Box & Basket Co. v. White,9 2 in which the requirement
was said not to attach to the regulations there involved.9 3 Orders
which do not entail definite legal consequences to private inter-
ests need not be preceded by safeguards which should attach to
regulations of greater or more immediate effect.94 There is no
prospect that the traditional basic doctrine, which attaches no
constitutionally-prescribed procedures to rule-making, will be
abandoned as respects the great mass of regulations issuing from
administrative agencies. The most one can say is that the courts
are inclined at times to apply constitutional provisions so as to
require some sort of procedural minima in some types of rule-
making, as they have with respect to adjudication; but these re-
quirements will be confined to proceedings in which vital private
interests are directly at stake, and they will vary."' The tendency
toward rigidifying the requirement of a judicial type of proce-
dure, which for a while was manifested because of the second
Morgan decision, seems unlikely to endure. 97
It is particularly to be hoped that the courts will not insist
92. (1935) 296 U. S. 176.
93. The reasons for applying the requirement of findings in the one case
and not in the other are impossible to discern. Fuchs, supra note 45, at
140-141.
94. See the holding in Ray v. Parker (1940) 15 Cal. (2d) 275, 101 P.
(2d) 665, that the initial designation of a milk marketing area under a
milk control act, since it does not have immediate legal consequences, need
not be preceded by a hearing. The entire problem of the procedural safe-
guards necessary in the formation of special improvement districts by other
than legislative agencies turns upon whether their formation entails tax
liability without further proceedings in which a hearing may be had. Potts,
Due Process in Local Assessments (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 457. If a hear-
ing is held, its incidents may vary because of the number of parties in-
volved or for other reasons. Fuchs, supra note 33, at 277.
95. The proposal by three members of the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure that Congress enact a code of administrative
procedure for the guidance of federal agencies, extends to procedure in
rule-making. Final Report (1941) 214-216. The proposed code is for the
most part not mandatory, however; and even its requirement that "formal"
rule-making hearings shall be held in situations where the applicable
statutes call for hearings, does not define the incidents of a formal hear-
ing except to indicate that cross-examination and rebuttal testimony, to the
extent that these will be useful, should be permitted and to require an inter-
mediate report prior to argument, unless the argument is preceded by the
announcement of tentative regulations. Id. at 229 (proposed code, §209 (d)).
96. Text at note 42, supra.
97. The recently-strengthened tendency of the Supreme Court to defer
to the judgment of administrative agencies within their fields of competence
extends to matters of procedure. Comment (1940) 25 WAsHINGTON U. LAW
QUAR TrLY 608, discussing Federal Communications Comm. v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co. (1940) 309 U. S. 134.
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upon having detailed procedural safeguards written into the
statutes themselves. The need is great of permitting administra-
tive adaptation and of having the courts confine themselves to
judging procedure as it actually evolves administratively. If the
formulation of a particular regulation has been accompanied by
due procedure, that is all that should be required,98 at least where
the opportunity to challenge a regulation on procedural grounds
exists9 9 There is, of course, every reason why legislation should
embody procedural safeguards, the desirability of which is
known. 100 But to require this in all cases would be to impose an
impossible burden. It should be enough that legislative and ad-
ministrative action, taken together, have in a specific situation
provided a reasonable safeguard against abuse.
The evolution of constitutional doctrine in respect to rule-mak-
ing procedure, as well as the outcome just suggested, establishes
litigation in each particular instance as the sole means of deter-
mining with finality whether or not constitutional requirements
have been observed; for there is no precise rule to apply. Fre-
quent burdensome litigation would be the inevitable result if the
courts were to become meticulous in retroactively imposing their
own detailed views in regard to procedure. There would be no
98. The question of whether notice and hearing must be explicitly pro-
vided by statute in connection with administrative "adjudications" for which
they are constitutionally necessary has long been an important one. The
view that this should not be required is excellently stated in Gellhorn, Ad-
mnnistrative Law, Cases and Comments (1940) 451, 460. In rule-making,
for which the procedure probably is more variable, it would be doubly un-
fortunate to require that the legislature must attempt to specify it in
advance.
99. Where statutory judicial review of regulations is provided, the alle-
gation of deficiencies in the procedure accompanying the formulation of a
regulation would clearly present issues affecting the legality of the regula-
tion, upon which the court would be competent to pass. In the absence
of a statutory method of review, a challenge to a regulation on constitu-
tionally-supported procedural grounds, advanced in an equity suit or de-
claratory judgment action or by way of defense to an enforcement pro-
ceeding, would permit an inquiry into any essential points of. procedure.
Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. U. S. (1935) 23 C. C. P. A. 145, 76 F. (2d) 412 (mis-
leading notice); Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture (C. C. A. 7,
1941) 120 F. (2d) 258 (omission of essential finding). See Hart, loc. cit.
supra, note 28: "This is *** a matter upon which the courts are entirely
competent to check up * * * With reference to procedure the courts can
review administrative action without usurping policy-determining func-
tions."
100. The merit of recent statutes imposing detailed procedural require-
ments in rule-making is now being tested in practice and may furnish a
guide to future legislation dealing with similar subjects. Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit. supra, note 29, at 110;
Fuchs, The Formulation and Review of Regulations under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (1939) 6 L. & Contem. Prob. 43, 53 et seq.
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certainty until the parties had tried out their several views be-
fore the sole authority that had final power to decide. Such an
outcome seems unlikely now, however. The Supreme Cqurt has
given ample evidence of a policy of permitting procedural inde-
pendence, as well as a free exercise of discretionary substantive
powers,101 to administrative agencies.102 This tendency probably
will be reflected in the state courts also. The result of it in regard
to rule-making procedure, even when this is subject to a judicial
check in respect to its constitutionality, will be to sustain any
reasonably-devised procedure, whether or not the accompanying
safeguards are of the "judicial" type. There will be an accom-
panying discouragement to ill-founded litigation. Affected pri-
vate interests, in cooperation with administrative agencies, will
in the main give attention to the essential task of suggesting and
maintaining sensible, effective methods. 10 3
The second constitutional implication, mentioned above as de-
riving from the opinion in the Opp Cotton Mills case, is that the
federal courts may properly undertake the type of judicial re-
view of administrative regulations which is required of them
with respect to wage orders under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The question does not bear upon the constitutional minimum of
judicial review;10°4 it has to do rather with the maximum. That
Congress may not require the federal courts to go beyond the
judicial function by entering into administrative questions in
reviewing the acts and orders of administrative authorities has
long been recognized. 05 It is also established that out of an
administrative function which is non-judicial in character there
may arise questions which courts may properly be called upon
to determine 0 6 The trick is, of course, to distinguish between
101. Railroad Comm. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co. (1940) 310 U. S. 573,
commented on in (1941) 26 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 265.
102. See note 97, supra.
103. The recommendation of the Attorney General's Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure that an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure
be established would result, if adopted, not only in continuous study and
coordination of the procedural methods of the federal agencies but also in
the creation of a channel through which the experience and opinion of those
affected by administrative regulations might be brought to bear. Final
Report (1941) 123.
104. Id. at 80.
105. Id. at 79; Federal Radio Comm. v. General Electric Co. (1930) 281
U. S. 464.
106. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Brimson (1894) 154 U. S. 447;
Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtg. Co. (1933) 289 U. S.
266; Fuchs, supra note 37, at 555.
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those aspects of a proceeding that are so essentially administra-
tive that a court may not be called upon to enter into them and
those aspects, on the other hand, which are suitable for judicial
determination. In general it seems that the exercise of the dis-
cretion which is entrusted to an administrative agency is the
essence of the administrative task and cannot be imposed upon
a court.0 7 Any attempt on the part of Congress to require the
federal courts to formulate the content of an administrative regu-
lation thus would meet with a rebuff at the hands of the courts. 0 8
The Fair Labor Standards Act, together with most of the other
recent statutes patterned upon the same model, does not attempt
to impose this task upon the courts. 0 9 The scope of the judicial
review of regulations which it calls upon the courts to exercise
does, however, go beyond that which has traditionally been avail-
able with respect to administrative regulations. The traditional
type of review of such regulations has taken place collaterally in
enforcement proceedings or in injunction, declaratory judgment,
or other actions instituted to attack the legality of regulations.1 0
The issue in such proceedings, surrounding the validity of regu-
lations, is strictly one of law, relating to their legality under the
statutes, just as in cases in which the constitutionality of a
statute is attacked the issue is whether the statute conforms to
the Constitution."" In so far as statutory review of administra-
tive regulations is confined to the traditional legal issue of the
statutory authorization for them, it does not impose 'non-judicial
functions upon the courts; although it is necessary to provide
that the review proceedings must be instituted by parties having
a sufficient interest to generate a judicially-cognizable case or
controversy." 2 The review provided in the Fair Labor Standards
107. Fuchs, supra note 37, at 546; Hart, loc. cit. supra, note 28.
108. Fuchs, supra note 100, at 65-66.
109. Ibid.
110. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit.
supra, note 29, at 115.
111. Cases in which regulations, allegedly promulgated under statutory
power, have been held invalid because they were in excess of the statutory
authorization include the following: Waite v. Macy (1918) 246 U. S. 606;
Utah Power & Light Co. v. U. S. (1917) 243 U. S. 389; United States v.
Johnson (D. C. Nev. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 256; Nolan v. Morgan (C. C. A.
7, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 471; People v. Love (1921) 298 Ill. 304, 131 N. E.
809, 16 A. L. R. 708.
112. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act judicial review of regulations
may be requested by a person "aggrieved"--presumably one who has an
interest sufficient and sufficiently threatened, to generate a case or con-
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Act and other recent legislation conforming to the same pat-
tern 1 1 provides in addition, however, that the courts shall set
aside a regulation if a finding upon which it is based is not sup-
ported by substantial evidence, contained in the record of the
administrative proceedings. The question that has arisen in some
minds, and which the Supreme Court impliedly answers affirma-
tively in the Opp Cotton Mills case, is whether such an inquiry
into the evidentiary support for a finding of fact, upon which a
regulation is based, is an inquiry of a judicial nature.
There appears to be no previous direct authority upon the point
just mentioned. It is, of course, well established that a similar
inquiry into the evidentiary support for an essential finding in
an administrative adjudication is a proper incident to judicial
review of the order in which the proceeding has eventuated. 114
But it has been pointed out that the kinds of facts which form
the substance of the findings in rule-making, as well as the evi-
dence bearing upon them, are different in character from the
findings and the evidence in adjudicatory proceedings.1 The
latter relate to particular events and to facts affecting the ex-
istence of rights and duties in specific individuals. They involve
the kinds of determinations which juries and courts have tradi-
tionally made. The findings of fact which underlie administra-
tive regulations, on the other hand, relate largely to general
troversy. Text at note 13, supra. The language of other similar recent
legislation (note 58, supra) is equivalent. The code proposed by three mem-
bers of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
which provides for judicial review of regulations, specifies that the review
shall be "upon contest of its application * * * or upon proper application
for declaratory judgment * * * where the rule, or its thrbatened applica-
tion, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair,
the constitutional or statutory rights, privileges, immunities, or benefits of
any person." Final Report (1941) 230 (proposed code, §211). The Logan-
Walter Bill (76th Cong., 3rd sess., H. R. 6324), as amended for final pas-
sage, provided in its third section for review of regulations in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia "upon petition by any
person substantially interested in the effects" of such a regulation. In
Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture (C. C. A. 7, 1941) 120 F. (2d)
258, it was held that a producer of corn syrup had a sufficient interest in
regulations prescribing standards for sweetened condensed milk, which
barred his product from use by producers of the latter, to entitle him to
bring proceedings to test the regulation under §701(f) of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, note 117, infra.
113. Note 58, supra.
114. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit.
supra, note 29, at 88 et seq.
115. Id. at 118.
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tendencies and conditions and to the consequences of alternative
courses of action. Questions such as these do not lie tradition-
ally within the judicial sphere. It has been argued that there
is no benefit involved in attempting to subject administrative
judgment in such matters to review by the courts. 16 Had the
court in the Opp Cotton Mills case declined to undertake to re-
view the evidentiary support for the findings of the Administra-
tor, it would have established that the type of review usually
accorded collaterally to administrative regulations is the maxi-
mum that may be exacted of the courts. Review upon the admin-
istrative record would have remained an acceptable substitute,
however, for review after a trial, such as must take place when
collateral proceedings are had."1
It is difficult to see that any particular good can result from
judicial assumption of the duty to inquire into the support for
administrative findings of fact in rule-making proceedings. Harm
might result if the courts were likely to act without restraint
in substituting their judgment upon such issues for the judg-
ment of the administrative authorities. But again this seems
unlikely. ' 8 The federal courts, delving into administrative rec-
ords to inquire whether support exists in the evidence for essen-
tial findings of fact, will almost certainly find such evidence.119
116. Id. at 119.
117. Id. at 116. It might be argued from the analogy of the judicial
process in cases in which the constitutionality of statutes is challenged, that
the courts may not be restricted to the administrative record when "quasi-
legislative" acts are under review, but that, on the contrary, the courts
must be free to range more widely in seeking evidence of whether the rights
of a litigant have been infringed. A similar argument has had weight in
influencing the courts to go outside the administrative record in getting at
"constitutional" facts involved in an administrative decision. St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. U. S. (1936) 298 U. S. 38, 51. Whatever may be the
situation where constitutional rights are involved, however, there seems
little reason in connection with more ordinary matters for casting aside
the economy of confining the fact-gathering function to the agencies estab-
lished for the purpose. The newer federal acts providing for the judicial
review of regulations, like their counterparts involving administrative deci-
sions, specify that if the need of additional evidence arises upon review, the
proceedings shall be remanded to the administrative agency for this purpose.
Fair Labor Standards Act (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, 1066, c. 676, §10(a), 29
U. S. C. A. §210(a); Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (1938) 62 Stat. 1040,
1055, c. 675, §701(f) (2), 21 U. S. C. A. §371(f) (2).
118. Fuchs, supra note 100, at 63-64.
119. Administrative authorities, anticipating possible judicial review on
the basis of the administrative record, pursuant to a statutory provision
for such review, will hardly omit to include in the record some, and prob-
ably all, of the data upon which the regulation is based.
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The remaining questions will be the same ones, surrounding the
legality of the regulations under review, that would have arisen
in the more traditional type of collateral proceedings. What the
new statutes accomplish in respect to judicial review, therefore,
seems to be the substitution of a slightly different type of pro-
ceeding for that formerly employed, coupled with review on the
basis of the administrative record instead of upon a record newly
made in court.-O In so far as administrative records become un-
duly cumbersome because of the necessity of having an eye to
this type of judicial review, the result is regrettable. 121 In so
far, on the other hand, as the necessity of the reception of new
evidence in court is avoided, economy of effort will result. It is
too early as yet to cast the balance upon this account.122
In any case the Opp Cotton Mills decision lends implied judicial
sanction to an important series of legislative experiments with
respect to administrative rule-making procedure and judicial re-
view of regulations. At the same time it does not impose a rigid
constitutional mold upon procedure. The responsibility for evolv-
ing satisfactory patterns rests where it belongs--upon adminis-
trators, upon the legal profession, and upon Congress.1 23
120. The form of judgment will also be different in most cases. Whereas
in a collateral action involving the validity of a regulation the judgment
in terms disposes of the rights of the litigants in the light of the legal
conclusion regarding the regulation, the judgment upon statutory review
of the regulation will deal with the regulation itself. A question might be
raised regarding the constitutionality of requiring the courts to determine
"general" -questions in this manner. It would, however, be a picayunish
question, since the courts upon statutory review are only performing ex-
plicitly the same function that has been implicit in their work all along.
Were the constitutional question decided adversely to the review of the
regulations themselves, it would be possible to provide instead for the deter-
mination of the rights of the parties seeking review, upon the basis of the
courts' determination of the legality of the regulations. There would then
be no doubt that genuine declaratory judgments, rather than advisory opin-
ions, were contemplated by the statutes. The regulations might then, like
statutes that have been "declared" unconstitutional, retain a paralyzed ex-
istence after adverse decisions with regard to them. Their invalidity would
not be a matter adjudicated; but the doctrine of stare decisis would operate
powerfully to nullify them.
121. See the opinion in Ray v. Parker (1940) 15 Cal. (2d) 275, 101 P.
(2d) 665.
122. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, op. cit.
supra, note 29, at 110.
123. Three bills, proposing reforms in federal administrative procedure,
are now pending in Congress and have been made the subject of hearings
before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 10 U. S. L. Week
2030 (July 8, 1941); 9 id. 2584, 2599, 2631, 2646, 2659, 2675, 2695, 2711,
2723, 2739, 2759, 2776 (1941). A transcript of the hearings has been pub-
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lished in four parts. Two of the bills (77th Cong., 1st sess., S. 675, S. 674)
emanate from the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Proce-
dure and embody the legislative recommendations of the Committee and of
three of its members who favor more elaborate provisions. They are printed
in the Committee's Final Report (1941) 191, 217. The other bill (77th
Cong., 1st sess., S. 918) combines some of the features of the former Logan-
Walter bill with many of the provisions of S. 674, the separate bill of the
three Committee members. Considerable summarization and discussion of
the report of the Attorney General's Committee and of the pending bills
has been published. See, e. g., Analysis of Bills Accompanying Report of
Attorney General's Committee (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 140, and Administrative
Law Symposium (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 207; Feller, Administrative Law
Investigation Comes of Age (1941) 41 Colum. L. Rev. 589; Jaffe, The Report
of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941) 8
U. ChL L." Rev. 401; J. Hart, The Acheson Report, a Critique (1941) 26 Ia.
Ii. Rev. 801; Lavery, The Administrative Process (1941) 1 F. R. D. 651.
